Introspection and Acquaintance in Early Analytic Philosophy
Conference. University of Liège, 15-16 October 2025
Organized as part of the Creph ARC research project: MIND - The British Sources of Philosophy of Mind 1888-1949
» Poster [n/a]
Call-for-abstracts
In the context of the research project MIND – The British Sources of Philosophy of Mind, we are glad to announce the conference "Introspection and Acquaintance in Early Analytic Philosophy" to be held at the University of Liège on the 15th and 16th of October 2025.
These two closely connected themes were at the heart of some of the most vibrant debates among early analytic philosophers. The rise of empirical psychology prompted fundamental questions about the proper methods for investigating the mind. The general line of consensus among early analytic philosophers was that introspection, despite its acknowledged limitations, should be the preferred method of inquiry into the nature of mental phenomena—both in philosophical and psychological contexts (e.g., J. Laird, 1919; Robertson, 1883; Sully, 1881). But what is the nature of introspection? What are its precise limits? Are there different types of introspective access? Some philosophers held that inner and outer perception differ only in their objects, not in kind (Moore, 1905; Broad 1925). Others, by contrast, argued that we relate to mental states in a fundamentally different way than to external objects. A common idea was that one is aware of external objects via direct observation, but has an altogether different kind of access to one’s present mental acts, for these are never the objects of inner observation (e.g., John Laird, Moore, Broad, & Hicks, 1920; Stout, 1908).
The notion of acquaintance—famously developed by Bertrand Russell as a foundational kind of epistemic relation—was central to early analytic discussions of introspection. In his 1910 paper "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," Russell argued that acquaintance is a direct, non-inferential relation to things, including sense-data and one's own mental states (Russell 1910, 1912). This view positioned acquaintance as both a condition of introspective access and a ground of epistemic justification. In particular, acquaintance with one’s own mental states was thought to constitute a primitive kind of self-knowledge and to ground introspective knowledge of truths, making acquaintance indispensable for any account of the epistemology of mind. However, even among early analytic philosophers, the nature, scope, and epistemic status of acquaintance were subject to critical scrutiny. While some, like G.E. Moore, accepted that introspective self-awareness involves direct contact with mental entities, others were skeptical of the idea that such acquaintance yields knowledge in any robust epistemic sense (Hicks 1917; Edgell 1918; Hicks, Moore, Edgell, Broad 1919). These early tensions anticipate later debates over whether knowledge by acquaintance genuinely exists as a sui generis epistemic relation, or whether it is a dispensable fiction in theories of self-knowledge.
The conference aims to reconstruct and critically assess the views of early analytic philosophers on introspection and acquaintance, with particular attention to the epistemological and methodological roles these notions played in their evolving theories of mind. By bringing together scholars working on the history of early analytic philosophy with those engaged in current debates in philosophy of mind and epistemology, the conference seeks to illuminate both the historical roots and the enduring relevance of these concepts.
Submissions may approach the themes of the conference from a contemporary philosophical perspective, provided they engage substantially with figures, texts, or debates from the early analytic tradition.
Here is a non-exhaustive list of research questions we are interested in:
- What is the scope of introspection? What entities can be introspected?
- Are there illusions of introspection?
- Does introspection deliver knowledge? If so, of what type?
- What are the limits of introspection? And how do they affect its use in the philosophical and psychological inquiry about the mind?
- How did early analytic philosophers conceptualize the relation between introspection and acquaintance?
- Is introspection acquaintance-based? Is there introspective knowledge by acquaintance?
- Is consciousness transparent?
- What was the role assigned to introspection at the beginning of scientific psychology?
Practical Details
Those interested in presenting at the conference are invited to prepare an abstract of max. one page (excluding references) suitable for a 40/45-minute presentation and send it to vmartinis@uliege.be and jacopopallagrosi@gmail.com. Please make sure abstracts are ready for blind review.
There are no conference fees.
Deadline for submission: 30 June 2025
Notification of acceptance: 20 July 2025
For any queries, please contact: vmartinis@uliege.be or jacopopallagrosi@gmail.com
References
Broad, Charlie Dunbar. (1925). The Mind and its Place in Nature. Routledge.
Edgell, B. (1918). The Implications of Recognition. Mind, 27, 174-187.
Hicks, G.D. (1917). The Basis of Critical Realism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 17, 300-359.
Laird, J. (1919). Introspection. Mind, 28(112), 385-406.
Laird, John, G. E. Moore, C. D. Broad, and G. Dawes Hicks. (1920). Symposium: The Character of Cognitive Acts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 21, 123-160.
Moore, G. E. (1905). The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 6, 68-127.
Robertson, George Croom. (1883). Psychology and Philosophy. Mind, 8(29), 1-21.
Russell, B. (1910). Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11, 108-128.
Russell, B. (1912). The Problems of Philosophy. New York: Holt and Co. and London: William and Norgate.
Stout, G. F. (1908). Are Presentations Mental or Physical? A Reply to Professor Alexander. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 9, 226-247.
Sully, James. (1881). Illusions of Introspection. Mind, 6(21), 1-18.
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