Acquaintance and the Value of Subjectivity
Conference. University of Liège, Nov. 24-25, 2022
Organized as part of the Creph research project 'The Value of Subjectivity'
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Program
Thu 24 Nov.
→ Room: Salle de l'Horloge (Place du Vingt-Août 7, Central Building, Jesuits Wing, 2d mezzanine)
- 10:00-12:00 Uriah Kriegel (Rice University Houston), The epistemic significance of introspective acquaintance. Abstract
- Chair: Anna Giustina.
- 13:30-15:30 [Christiana Werner's talk is canceled] Thomas Raleigh (University of Luxembourg), Debasing Skepticism and Functionalism. Abstract
- Chair: Davide Bordini.
- 16:00-18:00 Íngrid Vendrell Ferran (University of Marburg), Can we imagine the phenomenology of an emotion we have never experienced? Abstract
- Chair: Denis Seron.
In this talk, I will argue for the following striking thesis: a creature just
like us but lacking the capacity for introspection or inner awareness would have no epistemically justified beliefs. The argument for
this starts from a variation on Sellars' myth of the given problem, and suggests that the only viable solution to it requires
subjects to enjoy direct acquaintance with the truthmakers of some of their beliefs. After distinguishing two notions of acquaintance,
I argue (i) that on the more demanding notion of acquaintance, only introspective impressions constitute states of acquaintance,
and (ii) that on the less demanding notion , perceptual experiences constitute states of acquaintance as well, but what they
acquaint us with are not the truthmakers of our perceptually based beliefs, and only introspective impressions acquaint us with
the truthmakers of corresponding beliefs. If all this is right, then introspective acquaintance with our own stream of consciousness
is the only thing that allows us to overcome the problem of the myth of the given and acquire epistemically justified beliefs.
Schaffer (2010) provides a genuinely novel and original form of skeptical
scenario based on the possibility that one's beliefs are not properly based on one's reasons/evidence. Although this form of debasing
skepticism has been much discussed by other epistemologists (see e.g. Brueckner (2011), Ballanytyne & Evans (2013) Conee (2015), Bondy
& Carter (2018), Smithies (2019), McCain (2020), Cunnigham (2021)), there are still various aspects of debasing skepticism that have
been missed or misunderstood. In this talk I try to clarify these various neglected aspects and then propose a new way of resisting
the debasing skeptic. I also discuss how the debasing scenario connects with various interesting and controversial principles in
epistemology and philosophy of mind.
Imagining what a particular emotion feels like is a relatively
common exercise in our everyday lives. It happens in decision-making, in empathy, in engaging with fictions, in planning,
daydreaming, affective forecasting, etc. Interestingly, we are able to imagine not only the phenomenology of emotions that we have
previously experienced but also of emotions not previously felt. For instance, you are able to imagine how humiliation feels even if
you have never experienced this emotion or you are able to imagine how parental love feels, though not being a parent yourself.
In this paper, I will argue that the last cases do not substantially differ from cases in which we imagine emotions previously felt.
I will first present a model to explain how we imagine emotions previously experienced and then expand it for the case of emotions
not previously felt.
Fri 25 Nov.
→ Room: Salle de l'Horloge (Place du Vingt-Août 7, Central Building, Jesuits Wing, 2d mezzanine)
- 10:00-12:00 Dorothea Debus (University of York), Relationalism, acquaintance and subjectivity: Some metaphysical implications. Abstract
- Chair: Frank Hofmann.
- 13:30-15:30 Matt Duncan (Rhode Island College), For they shall see good: The moral virtues of acquaintance. Abstract
- Chair: Thomas Raleigh.
- 16:00-18:00 Charles Siewert (Rice University Houston), Why care what's good for you? Abstract
- Chair: Arnaud Dewalque.
The present paper explores one account of acquaintance and subjectivity, namely
'relationalism' about perceptual experience. According to a relationalist, a subject who perceives an object stands in a direct
experiential relation to the relevant object, which gives her a subjective perspective onto the object with which she is thereby
acquainted. However, or so I show in this paper, a relationalist is committed to a non-reductive account of perceptual experience,
and thus of the mind more generally. Some might consider this to be a high cost of relationalism, but I argue that it is a theoretical
cost worth paying, because relationalism provides us with the best possible account of the value of subjectivity.
Are the smartest, most knowledgeable among us also the best among us? Or are all
the moral saints you know especially knowledgeable? Maybe not. At first blush, it may not seem like there is any especially strong
connection between one's moral and epistemic standing—between how good one is and how knowledgeable one is. And yet, more than a few
influential philosophers say otherwise. They say there is some very tight, very important connection between one's moral and epistemic
standing. In this paper, I sympathetically examine various versions of this claim. I start by clarifying the terrain and narrowing my
focus to a certain kind of epistemic trait--namely, first-personal awareness of, or acquaintance with, goodness--and its relation to
certain moral traits. Then I assess several arguments that purport to establish a connection between these traits. My goal is not to
conclusively show that there is a non-accidental, non-coincidental connection between a person's moral and epistemic character but
rather to draw out and discuss some of the appeal of this very old idea from a contemporary perspective.
We may a draw a distinction between a person's being the locus of intrinsically
good things, and their having features intrinsically beneficial to them to have—roughly speaking, a distinction between something being
a good in you, and its being good for you. It seems hard to deny that having certain kinds affective experiences are not merely goods
in you, but good for you to have, in the relevant sense. But is affective experience required for an entity to have intrinsic benefits
that go beyond those may that be deemed to come with self-preservation—is it required for "superordinate intrinsic benefits"?
Suppose there were intelligent beings who lacked subjective experience altogether, or conscious beings who completely lacked the
affective sort. Would anything be good for them in this way? I outline a broad conception of affect as the "cognitively inclusive
experience of satisfaction or dissatisfaction," and canvas some ways in which one might conceive of well-being in the absence of
affective experience. I find these alternatives inadequate, and argue that without affective experience, there is no satisfactory way
to apply the distinction between what is good in someone and what is (intrinsically and superordinately) good for them. I also explain
how my view can accommodate the conviction that there is much more to having what is good for you than just "feeling
good."
Discussants
- Davide Bordini (univ. de Fribourg)
- Arnaud Dewalque (Creph)
- Anna Giustina (Creph)
- Frank Hofmann (univ. de Luxembourg)
- Thomas Raleigh (univ. de Luxembourg)
- Denis Seron (Creph)