

# Creph ARC research project 2023-2027: MIND - The British Sources of Philosophy of Mind 1888-1949

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## Introduction

MIND is a research project in the history of analytic philosophy. Its aim is to gather a research team whose mandate will be to investigate important sources of philosophy of mind in early British analytic philosophy. It covers a period of time that spans over sixty years, from the foundation of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* in 1888 (first symposium: ‘Is Mind Synonymous with Consciousness?’) to the publication of Ryle’s *The Concept of Mind* in 1949 (and the critical reviews thereof in the *Proceedings* and in the journal *Mind* (Wisdom 1950; Hampshire 1950)).

Breaking with the standard narrative according to which it is not until the 1950s that philosophy of mind crystalized into a full-blown research program, MIND puts the focus on a family of British philosophers—henceforth referred to as ‘the Cambridge family’—who published quite extensively on the nature of the mind *before* 1950, philosophers who often discussed each other’s views in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* and in *Mind* (arguably two of the most prominent journals in the field). This intellectual family includes most notably George F. Stout, the heir of James Ward and editor of *Mind* from 1892 to 1920 (Passmore 1976), his two outstanding students in Cambridge, George E. Moore (himself editor of *Mind* from 1921 to 1947) and Bertrand Russell, and his assistant at the University of St. Andrews, Charlie D. Broad (an admirer of Russell and himself later a professor in Cambridge). It also includes long forgotten representatives or relatives of the Cambridge family such as Dawes Hicks, Shadworth H. Hodgson, John Laird, Henry H. Price or John Wisdom.

MIND’s primary objective is to reconstruct the various views and arguments these authors have put forward concerning the nature of the mind. More pointedly, it will address their views on the relation between (a) mind and consciousness, (b) mind and body, and (c) mind and matter. Its secondary objective is to assess the potential of their views to advance current-day philosophical discussions relating to these topics. Below, we first explain how these two objectives connect with the current research situation before describing them in somewhat greater detail.

## State of the Art

MIND builds up on recent advances in the history of analytic philosophy. It is motivated by a simple observation: although studies in the history of analytic philosophy have made considerable progress since Dummett’s much-debated interpretation (Dummett 1993), precious little is known about the groundbreaking contribution of British analytic philosophers to philosophy *of mind*. Conversely, studies in the history of philosophy of mind do not as a rule take into consideration mind theories that developed in early analytic philosophy. In this subsection we briefly review the extant scholarly literature and gather evidence for these two claims.

[1] *History of analytic philosophy*. Although historical considerations have not been altogether absent from the analytic tradition—think, for example, of the collection of essays titled *The Revolution in Philosophy* (Ayer et al. 1956) or Ayer’s sequel to Russell’s *A history of Western Philosophy* (Ayer 1982)—they have long been relegated to the backseat. Over the last two decades, things have changed, though. With the so-called ‘historical turn’ in analytic philosophy (Reck 2013), history of analytic philosophy has become a burgeoning research area with its own scientific association (SSHAP, founded in 2009 by Sandra Lapointe), conferences, workshops, book series (*History of Analytic Philosophy*, edited by Mike Beaney, 41 vols. since 2008), journal (*Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy*, 10 vols. since 2011) and handbook (Beaney 2013). Setting aside large-scale reconstructions of the analytic tradition (see, e.g., Milkov 1997a; 1997b; Soames 2014; 2017), considerable progress has been made on a number of specific fronts. We certainly have today a better understanding of the *Austrian*, *psychological* and *metaphysical* origins of analytic philosophy (see, e.g., Textor 2006; van der Schaar 2013; MacBride 2018)—not to mention a much more fine-grained understanding of the notion of analysis itself (Beaney 2007). These impressive achievements put us in a position to better appreciate the philosophical richness of early analytic views. Yet, early analytic philosophers are very rarely, if ever, approached from the perspective of philosophy of mind. Most historical reconstructions still regard them as philosophers of logic (e.g., Potter 2020) or philosophers of science (e.g., Costreie 2016), although some attention has been rightly devoted to Wittgenstein’s 1946-49 *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* (Wittgenstein 1980a; 1980b). In the extant literature, the excellent monograph on G.F. Stout by Maria van der Schaar (van der Schaar 2013) probably comes the closest to what we propose to do here. And yet, its scope and aim are entirely different, as it focuses on epistemological and ontological issues: unlike MIND, it does not take into consideration, for example, Stout’s important Gifford Lectures on *Mind and Matter* (Edinburgh 1919-21; Stout 1931), let alone the views held by other representatives of the Cambridge family (Broad 1925; Wisdom 1934, etc.).

[2] *History of philosophy of mind*. According to the still prevailing standard narrative (see, e.g., Horgan 2018), philosophy of mind is mainly born from the ashes of behaviorism in the 1950s. Granted that Ryle’s attempt to redescribe mental states as *dispositions to behave* is an important milestone in the history of philosophy of mind (Ryle 1949), it is not until the mind-brain identity theory (Place 1956; Feigl 1958; 1967; Smart 1959; Armstrong 1968) has been criticized in favor of functionalism that philosophy of mind turned into a full blown research program—or so the story goes. Recently, historians of philosophy began to question this story on several grounds. First, the standard narrative merely overlooks the historical and philosophical significance of 19<sup>th</sup>-century Austro-German philosophers such as Bolzano, Herbart, Brentano, Meinong and Stumpf, whose contributions are now better known (see Lapointe 2019). Especially, the spectacular revival of the Brentano studies suggests that Brentano’s mind theory is a crucial piece of the puzzle (see, among many others, Mulligan 2004; Tassone 2012; Fisette and Fréchette 2013; Kriegel 2017; 2018). Second, the standard narrative fails to do justice to the complexity of most of the topics that became central to 20<sup>th</sup>-century philosophy of mind, as evidenced by the excellent essays gathered in (Kind 2019). Third, since the standard narrative is centered on American philosophy, it does not account for mind theories that developed in other geographic areas, such as 20<sup>th</sup>-century French philosophy (Chimisso 2008)—not to mention non-Western views.

*The place of MIND in current research situation*. While these detrimental limitations of the standard narrative have been rightly addressed in the scholarly literature, we believe that the former suffers from yet another fundamental deficiency, namely: it is utterly blind to mind theories put forward in British analytic philosophy *after* Brentano but *before* 1950. It is this particular blind spot at the intersection of [1] and [2] that MIND is designed to address (see *fig. 1* below). Furthermore, MIND has a unique focus on the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* and the journal *Mind*. Not only have the

representatives of the Cambridge family been publishing in both journals; when the publication of the *Proceedings* was interrupted in 1896, Stout took the best papers of the Aristotelian Society in *Mind* until the New Series of the *Proceedings* was launched in 1900 (see Carr 1923; Staley 2009). Given MIND's focus on interrelations within the Cambridge family, a special attention will be paid to the symposia published in the *Proceedings* and to the numerous reviews *by* and *on* Cambridge philosophers in *Mind*, such as Russell's review of (Broad 1925), Broad's review of (Stout 1931) and Price's review of (Wisdom 1934).

## Objectives and Research Hypotheses

MIND's leading assumption is that the members of the Cambridge Family (Stout, Moore, Russell, Broad and their intellectual relatives) are best understood as *philosophers of mind*—authors who intended to offer, and often *did* offer, a substantial contribution to the study of the mind. MIND's *primary objective* is to reconstruct their positions on three questions concerning the nature of the mind, namely: what is the relation between mind and consciousness, mind and body, and mind and matter? Its *secondary objective* is to assess the potential of their views to advance current-day discussions relating to these topics. In this subsection we elaborate on these two objectives in somewhat greater detail. We distinguish between (1) *interpretive hypotheses* that will be tested by the gathering of textual evidence, (2) *theoretical claims* that will be assessed by discussing pro- and con-arguments, and (3) a more specific reconstruction dedicated to the philosophical views of *George Frederic Stout*—arguably the father of the Cambridge family and the central figure of this project.

### 1. Interpretive hypotheses: The Cambridge intellectual milieu

A preliminary step toward the proposed reconstruction-cum-evaluation is to get a grip of the overall intellectual framework within which the Cambridge theories of the mind developed. We shall test four distinct **hypotheses [H]** to that effect.

*Scientific psychology.* The last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century saw the rise of experimental psychology and Wundt's foundation of the first psychological lab in Leipzig (1879), soon to be followed with many others. Our first interpretive hypothesis [**H1**] is that the becoming autonomous of scientific psychology propelled two sets of interrelated questions at the top of the philosophical agenda: first, questions concerning the *scope* and *method* of psychology as a science, including the role of experimentation and the value of introspection (see, e.g., Stout 1888; 1915; Ward 1904; 1920; see also Gibson 1905; Hicks, Stout, and Field 1927; Gallie, Sprott, and Mace 1947); next, questions concerning the kind of *entities* that are referred to when psychologists use words such as 'mental' or 'conscious,' and the *meaning* of these words (Stout 1896; 1909; George E. Moore 1910; Hicks 1910; Russell 1921). MIND's first task will be to elaborate these two sets of questions and use them as a stepping stone to approach analytic theories of the mind in their historical context.

*Intentionality and the Brentanian legacy.* Our second research hypothesis [**H2**] is that another crucial ingredient of this historical context is Brentano's legacy. It is common knowledge that Stout's *Analytic Psychology* (Stout 1896) may be read as a continuation of the Brentanian research program (van der Schaar 2013; see also Schaar 1996). It is also well-known that Stout, as editor of *Mind*, commissioned several reviews of works written by members of the Brentano school, including Russell's well-known reviews of Meinong. Yet, one still needs to better appreciate the role played by Brentanian ideas in the shaping of analytic theories of the mind. Several claims by Brentano need to be taken into consideration, including the claim that intentionality is what best distinguishes mental from physical

phenomena and the claim that the notion of ‘mind’ can only be grasped by elucidating the more basic notion of ‘mental phenomenon’ (Brentano 1874; 1995)—or, as the Cambridge philosophers have it, the related notions of ‘mental act,’ ‘mental fact,’ ‘mental event,’ and ‘mental activity’ (Carr 1901; Stout 1906; Alexander et al. 1908; Laird et al. 1921; Burns 1926; Wisdom 1934; Gallie, Sprott, and Mace 1947). In most cases, Brentano’s legacy has been more or less criticized and *transformed* by Cambridge philosophers who, for example, questioned the relevance of the notions of ‘intentional content’ (George E. Moore 1910) and ‘intentional act’ (Russell 1921).

*Analysis.* Given what precedes, one sub-project of MIND is to spell out what, if anything, is the distinctive feature, or features, of the Cambridge approach to the mind. There is little doubt that what is known as ‘the method of analysis’ plays a crucial role here. The most striking example arguably is John Wisdom’s *Problems of Mind and Matter*, which is explicitly presented as an application of the analytic method to mind-related issues (Wisdom 1934). Yet, given the varieties of analysis employed by analytic philosophers (Beaney 2007), more should be said concerning the sense in which Cambridge theories of the mind are ‘analytic.’ Our hypothesis [H3] is that Moore’s article on “The Subject-Matter of Psychology” (George E. Moore 1910) can be considered a sort of *prototype* of the Cambridge analytic method, when applied to the study of the mind. Interestingly, it combines an extensional approach to mentality (i.e., what are the *entities* in the universe that are said to be ‘mental’?) with an intensional approach, which aims to clarify the *meaning* of the related notions of ‘mentality’ by using analytic tools such as decomposition or paraphrase—a method that, arguably, virtually all members of the Cambridge family comply with (see also Broad 1925; Wisdom 1934, 10 ff.). In this respect, one goal of MIND will be to understand how this analytic method has shaped the Cambridge theories of the mind.

*Pathbreaking intuitions.* When it comes to contemporary philosophy of mind, the landscape has been heavily shaped by a number of pathbreaking intuitions such as the transparency intuition (Harman 1990; Tye 1995; see Paul 2014), the zombie intuition (Kirk 1974; Chalmers 1996; see Kirk 2021) and the intuition underlying the knowledge argument (Jackson 1982; 1986; see Nida-Rümelin 2009). MIND’s fourth underlying hypothesis [H4] is that these three intuitions can actually be traced back to members of the Cambridge family. As is well-known, the transparency intuition originates in G.E. Moore’s famous refutation of idealism (G. E. Moore 1903), although it is doubtful that Moore embraced a strong version of the transparency thesis (Kind 2003; Strawson 2015). Importantly, C.D. Broad arguably offered the first actual discussion of the transparency intuition (see Laird et al. 1921; Broad 1925). The zombie intuition is anticipated by Stout’s scenario of a “zombie” world deprived of experiencing individuals (Stout 1931, 138–39). And the intuition underlying the knowledge argument can be traced back to Broad’s omniscient “archangel” unable to predict the characteristic smell of ammonia (Broad 1925, 71). Part of our mandate in MIND will be to reinterpret these intuitions against the background of the Cambridge analytic context and to compare them with the versions thereof that have been circulating more recently in contemporary philosophy of mind. This task will work as a transition between our interpretive hypotheses and the examination of theoretical claims.

## 2. Theoretical claims: The Cambridge theories of the mind

Let us now turn to the substantial views of the mind held in the Cambridge family. Here, in addition to testing our interpretive hypotheses, we will reconstruct and assess the arguments that Cambridge philosophers offered *for* (or *against*) a series of **theoretical claims** [C].

*Mind and consciousness.* As pointed out at the outset, the first set of substantial questions to be addressed in MIND concerns the relation between (a) mind and consciousness. This choice is explained by the fact that, for Cambridge philosophers, the elucidation of ‘mental’ and ‘conscious’ is prerequisite

to a rigorous treatment of the metaphysical question concerning the relation of (b) mind and body and (c) mind and matter (see, e.g., Stout's criticism of Alexander in Stout 1909). One first organizing question here is whether 'mental' and 'conscious' are *co-extensional*, to the effect that all entities that are mental are also conscious, and vice versa. Another question is whether 'mental' and 'conscious' are *synonymous*: this is the very question that opens the series of symposia in the *Proceedings of Aristotelian Society* (Shadworth et al. 1888). Another way of putting these two questions is to ask whether there are mental acts, facts, events or processes that can be said to be 'unconscious,' and if so, what is the relevant way of understanding 'unconscious' (Broad 1923; 1925, 354 ff.). On these questions, MIND will reconstruct and assess the arguments offered by Cambridge philosophers for (or against) the following two claims: [C1] the most fundamental notion for our understanding of the mind is that of mental *acts* (George E. Moore 1910); [C2] all mental acts can be said to be conscious in some relevant sense (Broad 1925).

*Mind and body.* The second set of theoretical claims MIND will address concerns the relation between (b) mind and body. While some argue that [C3] mind and body can interact (*interactionism*), others argue that [C4] they merely run parallel courses (*parallelism*), others that [C5] mental facts are caused by physical facts but do not cause physical facts (*epiphenomenalism*), yet others [C6] that they are two aspects of the same reality (*double-aspect theory*), and yet others that [C7] all mental events actually are bodily events (*materialism*). Now all these claims have been subject to lively debates within and without the Aristotelian Society (Benecke 1901; Carr 1911; 1918; Joad, Ewing, and Maciver 1936). While Stout offered arguments against the strong versions of all these claims and instead favored the view that bodily events and mental events necessarily 'complete' each other (Stout 1931), Broad attempted to refute the arguments against interactionism (Broad 1918; 1925, 95–133) and Wisdom suggested to explore a modified version of Stout's view (Wisdom 1934, 109). Again, MIND will reconstruct the pros and cons relating to C3-C7, before evaluating them.

*Mind and matter.* MIND's third set of substantial questions concerns the relation between (c) mind and matter. One issue here is whether one should accept the claim that there simply is no such thing as a mental fact/event (*materialism*) [cf. C7], whether [C8] there are events in the world that are purely material and other events that are purely mental (*dualism*), or whether [C9] some primitive mental ingredient is already a constituent of the material world (*panpsychism*). In this respect, MIND will compare and contrast various panpsychist views argued for in the Cambridge family, including Russellian monism (Russell 1927) and Stout's "common-sense animism" (Stout 1931). Interestingly, Broad, in his thorough discussion of this question, argued that the problem of "the place of mind in nature" is much more complex and can actually be factorized in no less than seventeen conflicting claims (Broad 1925)—an analysis echoed, with a more modest factorization, in David Chalmers's well-known paper on "The Place of Consciousness in Nature" (Chalmers 2002). Once again, MIND will offer a reconstruction of the Cambridge arguments that speak *for* or *against* C8-C9, before evaluating them.

### 3. A unifying element: Stout's philosophical views

Whereas the tasks described above are instrumental to MIND's objectives, it may be objected that they are not sufficient to get a complete unified picture of the Cambridge philosophy of mind. Indeed, the proposed reconstruction wouldn't be complete without understanding the historical and philosophical significance of *G.F. Stout*, the unifying figure of the Cambridge family and acclaimed author of *A Manual of Psychology* (Stout 1915)—arguably at that time one of the most influential works on the foundations of psychology, along with Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (Baldwin 1901; 1902). The more specific task of grasping Stout's significance is *transversal* to the whole project,

as his influence can be detected all across the board from the examination of **H1-4** to the discussion of **C1-9**. We shall therefore set it apart as a distinct, albeit closely related, task.




Fig. 1 MIND: An attempt at filling the gap

## Methodology

MIND is a project in the history of analytic philosophy. We will therefore employ tried-and-tested tools of history of philosophy, to wit: *historical narration* and *doctrinal reconstruction* (see Panaccio 2019). Given its focus on *causal* connections between discursive *acts*, the method of historical narration will be the main tool to test **H1-4** and address the Cambridge intellectual milieu (e.g., Ward’s and Brentano’s influence on Stout, Stout’s influence on Broad and Wisdom, etc.). By contrast, doctrinal reconstruction is concerned with *logical* connections relating to the *content* of philosophical theories. It will therefore be our prime tool when it comes to rationally reconstructing the arguments *for* or *against* **C1-9**. As for the philosophical assessment of these arguments, we will use a classical combination of criteria employed in contemporary philosophy, which include inferential validity, phenomenological adequacy and theoretical consistency.

## Workplan

MIND is scheduled to start on the 1<sup>st</sup> October 2023. To bring it to successful completion by the 30<sup>th</sup> September 2027, we will divide it into eight work packages [WP] as follows:

- WP1:** philosophical foundations of scientific psychology, H1.
- WP2:** intentionality and the Brentano legacy, H2.
- WP3:** the method of analysis, H3.
- WP4:** pathbreaking intuitions, H4.
- WP5:** the relation between mind and consciousness, C1-C2.
- WP6:** the relation between mind and body, C3-C7.
- WP7:** the relation between mind and matter, C8-C9.
- WP8:** Stout’s significance, a transversal inquiry.

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